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Pravda: Understanding the Rights of Deaf and Hard of Hearing Individuals

UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHTS OF DEAF
AND HARD OF HEARING INDIVIDUALS TO
MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN COURT
PROCEEDINGS
Douglas M. Pravda*
Teri Mosier, a deaf lawyer, graduated from the Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law at the University of Louisville in 1998, and was admitted
to practice in the Commonwealth of Kentucky in 1999.1 In 2007, Mosier
requested that the Commonwealth of Kentucky provide her with a sign
language interpreter in order to represent clients in Kentucky’s Courts of
Justice, the judicial system in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.2 The
Commonwealth of Kentucky, through its Administrative Office of the
Courts, refused to provide sign language interpreters for Mosier’s court
appearances.3
Scott Harrison, a lawyer with severe to profound hearing loss,
practices criminal law in the State of Florida.4 Harrison spent more than
seven years as an assistant public defender in Florida’s Ninth Judicial
Circuit, which covers the Orlando area, during which time he handled
approximately seventy criminal jury trials using a real-time court
reporter provided by the State.5 Harrison then started a criminal defense
practice in central Florida, and, in 2006, requested real-time court
reporters to transcribe criminal trials and other hearings in certain
judicial circuits. His request was denied.6
These are two recent examples in a lengthy and well-documented
history of discriminatory treatment against the deaf and hard of hearing
in the provision of meaningful access to court services. In 2004, the
Supreme Court recognized in Tennessee v. Lane that “[t]he unequal
treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services
has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to

Counsel, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. The author wishes to thank
Samson Enzer, Eric Stone, and Michael Stein for comments on drafts of this Article.
1
Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II), 675 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (E.D. Ky. 2009); see also TERI L.
MOSIER PORTFOLIO, http://www.tlmosier.4t.com (providing biographical background).
2
Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
3
Id.
4
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive
Relief and Compensatory Damages ¶¶ 13–15 Harrison v. Office of the State Courts Adm’r,
2007 WL 1576351 (M.D. Fla. filed June 8, 2007) (No. 6:06-cv-1878) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint].
5
Id. ¶¶ 17, 21.
6
Id. ¶ 22.
*
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remedy the problem of disability discrimination.”7 The Court explained
that prior to the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), Congress learned “that many individuals, in many States
across the country, were being excluded from courthouses and court
proceedings by reason of their disabilities.”8 A congressional task force
“heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities
from state judicial services and programs, including exclusion of persons
with visual impairments and hearing impairments from jury service
[and] failure of state and local governments to provide interpretive
services for the hearing impaired.”9
For the deaf and hard of hearing, denial of accommodations is often
tantamount to denial of access to the courts. A deaf or hard of hearing
lawyer like Mosier and Harrison, or a deaf or hard of hearing judge,
party, juror, witness, or spectator who is unable to participate in a court
proceeding for lack of an appropriate accommodation is plainly denied
her right of access to the courts. In enacting the ADA, Congress
recognized that “failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will
often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion.”10 The “duty
to accommodate,” the Supreme Court held in Lane, “is perfectly
consistent with the well-established due process principle that, ‘within
the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a
meaningful opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.”11
This Article reviews the legal rights of deaf and hard of hearing
individuals to appropriate courtroom accommodations. Part I of this
Article describes the primary sources of the legal rights of deaf and hard
of hearing participants in the judicial system. It discusses the legal rights
of the deaf to accommodations in court proceedings under the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Court Interpreters Act, as well as Judicial
Conference policy on interpreters in federal courts. The Department of
Justice (“DOJ”), which issues regulations implementing the ADA as it
pertains to access to courts, has recently amended its regulations. The
new regulations, which became effective March 15, 2011, strengthen the
existing rights of the deaf and hard of hearing to courtroom
accommodations. Part I also touches on advances in technology and on
emerging technologies that permit courts to provide accommodations.
The increase in the use and affordability of real-time reporting, in which
a deaf or hard of hearing individual can obtain a simultaneous written
7
8
9
10
11

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/3

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
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transcription of court proceedings, has the potential to increase the
ability of deaf and hard of hearing participants to access the judicial
system. Other significant advances like remote video interpreting
(though it will require significant investments in technology) offer the
potential to alleviate a pressing problem in the availability of sign
language interpreters.
Although the legal rights to accommodations of all deaf and hard of
hearing participants in the court system derive from the same laws, there
are some variations in those rights depending on the capacity in which
the deaf or hard of hearing individual is participating in the legal
proceeding: as lawyer, judge, litigant (criminal defendant or party to a
civil proceeding), witness, juror, or spectator. Part II of this Article uses
recent vignettes, like those of Mosier and Harrison above, to discuss the
legal rights of the deaf in each of these capacities. These vignettes
explore current issues in the law of courtroom access by the deaf and
hard of hearing.
As this Article shows below, the law has come a long way since the
days when the deaf were routinely excluded from judicial proceedings.
Today, the biggest obstacle to courtroom access for the deaf is lack of
knowledge. Many deaf individuals are unaware of their rights to such
accommodations. Judges and court clerks are often unaware that the
deaf individuals generally have the right to such appropriate
accommodations free of charge. Many are unaware of the technologies
that are available to provide accommodations to deaf and hard of
hearing participants in the judicial system.
By highlighting the
developments in the law and the technology, this Article aims to increase
knowledge in order to ensure deaf and hard of hearing individuals full
and equal access to the court system.
I. THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING PARTICIPANTS IN
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A. Legal Right to Accommodations in State and Local Courts
The legal rights of deaf and hard of hearing lawyers to obtain
accommodations in state courts, such as those in which Mosier and
Harrison sought accommodations, are governed by the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”).12 Under the ADA and Rehab
Act, state and local courts must provide and pay for accommodations for
12
See Marc Charmatz & Antoinette McRae, Access to the Courts: A Blueprint for Successful
Litigation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, 3 MARGINS: MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 333 (Fall 2003) (containing a helpful overview of
these laws).
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deaf participants in legal proceedings, subject only to certain defenses
such as unreasonable accommodation and undue burden.
The ADA is a broad remedial statute that is designed to address a
long and pervasive history of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities in areas such as employment, housing, education, and
voting.13 Title II of the ADA addresses access to public services,
including state and local court systems.
The anti-discrimination
mandate of Title II is that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”14
This mandate covers courtroom access for the deaf and hard of
hearing in state and local courts. First, the provision covers state and
local courts. The term “public entity” is defined to include “any State or
local government” and “any department, agency, special purpose
district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government.”15 A state or local court system is an “instrumentality” of a
state or local government.
The notes to the DOJ’s regulations
implementing Title II explain that “public entities” include “the judicial
branches of State and local governments.”16 Second, this provision
covers participation in the legal proceedings in such courts. The
“services, programs, or activities” include the legal proceedings that take
place in the courtroom. For instance, in a section addressing the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, the notes to the DOJ regulations
implementing Title II explain that an effective aid for a deaf or hard of
hearing individual in a courtroom could include “‘computer-assisted
transcripts,’ which allow virtually instantaneous transcripts of
courtroom argument and testimony to appear on displays.”17
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
Id. § 12132.
15
Id. § 12131(1)(A)–(B).
16
28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A, comment to § 35.102 (2010); see also Galloway v. Super. Ct.
of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 19 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that Superior Court was a public entity
under Title II of the ADA).
17
28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A, comment to § 35.160 (2010); see also Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d
469, 472 (8th Cir. 1998) (exclusion of a mobility-impaired veteran from county quorum
court due to his inability to access a second floor courtroom violated the ADA); Gregory v.
Admin. Office of the Courts of N.J., 168 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that hard
of hearing person stated a claim under the ADA when state officials denied his request to
provide real-time transcription services in court proceedings); Soto v. City of Newark, 72 F.
Supp. 2d 489, 494 (D.N.J. 1999) (determining that a municipal court was a “service,
program or activity” of a public entity when it conducted weddings at the municipal
courthouse); Santiago v. Garcia, 70 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.P.R. 1999) (finding that a hard of
hearing litigant in civil trial stated a prima facie claim under the ADA for exclusion from
courtroom proceedings due to inability to follow those proceedings); Matthews v.
13
14
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Third, this provision covers the participation by deaf and hard of
hearing individuals. The term “qualified individual with a disability” is
defined as
an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,
the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids
and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements
for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity.18
A person who is deaf or hard of hearing is an individual with a
disability. The ADA defines the term “disability” to include a physical
impairment that “substantially limits one or more major life activities”
and defines “major life activities” to include “hearing.”19 In the context
of courtroom access, the deaf or hard of hearing individual will virtually
always be a “qualified” individual with a disability. For instance, the
deaf or hard of hearing lawyer seeking accommodations in state or local
courts will presumably be licensed or admitted to practice in that court
and will therefore meet the “essential eligibility requirements” for
participation in court proceedings. Similarly, a deaf litigant or witness
also meets the eligibility requirements as he or she is entitled to
participate in courtroom proceedings by virtue of his or her status as a
plaintiff or defendant or witness in a case. A deaf or hard of hearing
juror is “qualified” under the ADA because he or she has been called to
serve as a juror.20
Like the ADA, the Rehab Act was designed to address
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to provide them
with the tools necessary to achieve equality of opportunity and full
inclusion in society in areas such as employment, housing, education,
voting, and public services.21 Section 504 of the Rehab Act provides that
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 534 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (finding that failure to accommodate
paraplegic by scheduling court proceedings in an accessible courtroom violated ADA).
18
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
19
Id. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A) (Supp. II 2008).
20
Cf. Galloway, 816 F. Supp. at 18–20 (holding that blind persons were “otherwise
qualified” to serve as jurors and that District of Columbia superior court’s policy of
excluding blind persons from jury duty violated the ADA).
21
See generally Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”22 In the
context of courtroom access, the standards applicable for a Rehab Act
claim are identical to those under Title II of the ADA. The only
difference is that the Rehab Act applies only to state or local courts that
receive federal financial assistance.
B. Legal Right to Accommodations in Federal Courts
Federal courts are not subject to the ADA or the Rehab Act.23
Instead, the legal rights to accommodations in federal courts are
governed by the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 and by judicial policy.
Under the Court Interpreters Act, the presiding judicial officer shall
appoint an interpreter at court expense “in judicial proceedings
instituted by the United States” when the judicial officer determines,
either on his own or by motion of a party, that
such party (including a defendant in a criminal case), or
a witness who may present testimony in such judicial
proceedings . . .
....
suffers from a hearing impairment . . . so as to inhibit
such party’s comprehension of the proceedings or
communication with counsel or the presiding judicial
officer, or so as to inhibit such witness’ comprehension
of questions and the presentation of such testimony.24
The Act provides no automatic right to an interpreter. Rather, it is
left to the “presiding judicial officer”—meaning a United States district
judge, bankruptcy judge, magistrate judge, or the United States Attorney
with respect to grand jury proceedings25—to determine whether to
provide such an interpreter.26 In practice, however, the presiding
judicial officer’s discretion is typically exercised in cases involving
requests for foreign language interpreters (which are also covered by the
Id. § 504; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)–(b) (showing that the relevant “program or activity” under the
Rehab Act refers only to states and local governments or to any executive agency (not
judicial branch) of the federal government); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (showing that the
Americans with Disabilities Act defines public entities only in terms of states and local
governments).
24
28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (2006).
25
Id. § 1827(i) (defining “presiding judicial officer”).
26
Cf. United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting, in the context of
a request for a foreign language interpreter, that there is no automatic right to an
interpreter under the Court Interpreters Act).
22
23
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Act) where there may be a question as to the degree to which a party or
witness understands and communicates in English.27 With a deaf or
hard of hearing party or witness, it is more obvious that the individual’s
impairment inhibits his comprehension of the proceedings.
The primary limitation of this Act is that it requires an interpreter to
be appointed at court expense only in judicial proceedings instituted by
the United States. The statute therefore covers all federal criminal
matters (which must be brought by the federal government), including
pretrial and grand jury proceedings, but does not cover most civil
matters (which are primarily brought by private litigants, not by the
government).28
Even where a proceeding is not instituted by the United States, the
Act also permits—but does not require—the presiding judicial officer to
appoint at court expense
a certified or otherwise qualified sign language
interpreter to provide services to a party, witness, or
other participant in a judicial proceeding . . . if the
presiding judicial officer determines, on such officer’s
own motion or on the motion of a party or other
participant in the proceeding, that such individual
suffers from a hearing impairment.29
This provision vests “judicial officers with the discretion to provide sign
language interpreters at court expense, subject to the availability of
funds, to any participant in any type of judicial proceeding.”30
A second limitation of this Act is that it requires an interpreter to be
appointed at court expense only for a party or for a witness. The Act
permits an interpreter to be appointed at court expense for “other
participant[s] in a judicial proceeding” if “such individual suffers from a
hearing impairment,” but again does not require the appointment of an
interpreter for such other participants.31
27
E.g. United States v. Black, 369 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying interpreter
for witness who asked to testify in Navajo language because witness was able to give clear
and responsive answers in English throughout her testimony).
28
See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(j) (“[J]udicial proceedings instituted by the United States” include
all such proceedings “whether criminal or civil, including pretrial and grand jury
proceedings conducted in, or pursuant to the lawful authority and jurisdiction of a United
States district court” (parenthetical omitted)).
29
§ 1827(l).
30
S. REP. No. 104–366, at 35 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4215.
31
28 U.S.C. § 1827(l). Defendants who have been denied an interpreter request under
the Court Interpreters Act have appealed that denial on the grounds that the presiding
judicial officer abused his discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 659–

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 3

934

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

This law has been supplemented by official federal policy of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. In September 1995,
“the Judicial Conference adopted a policy that all federal courts provide
reasonable accommodations to persons with communications
disabilities” and directed the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts to develop written guidelines to implement this policy.32 The
written guidelines prepared by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts and adopted by the Judicial Conference in March 1996,
provide the following: “Each federal court is required to provide, at
judiciary expense, sign language interpreters or other appropriate
auxiliary aids or services to participants in federal court proceedings
who are deaf, hearing-impaired, or have other communications
disabilities.”33 Under the federal policy, “‘[c]ourt [p]roceedings’ include
trials, hearings, ceremonies and other public programs or activities
conducted by a court,” and “‘[p]articipants’ in court proceedings include
parties, attorneys, and witnesses.”34
C. What Accommodations Are Required?
These laws provide that the deaf and hard of hearing have legal
rights to obtain accommodations in court proceedings. But to what
accommodations are the deaf or hard of hearing participants entitled? In
state and local courts, where accommodations are governed by the ADA
and the Rehab Act, the DOJ regulations implementing Title II explain
what public entities must do to comply with the anti-discrimination
mandate that a public entity may not exclude a qualified individual with
a disability from participation in or deny the benefits of their services,
programs, or activities. Two provisions are particularly relevant to the
issue of courtroom access. First, “[a] public entity shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
63 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion under the Court
Interpreters Act by failing to appoint a second interpreter to enable non-English speaking
defendants to communicate with counsel while the first interpreter was interpreting the
ongoing court proceedings).
32
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 13–
14 (Mar. 12, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/96-Mar.pdf.
33
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES,
vol. 1, ch. III, pt. H, at 37–39 (Guidelines for Providing Services to the Hearing-Impaired
and Other Persons with Communications Disabilities) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.nad.org/issues/justice/courts/communicationaccess-federal-courts.
34
Id.
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modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
Second, “[a] public entity shall furnish
program, or activity.”35
appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an
individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and
enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a
public entity.”36
The ADA defines “auxiliary aids and services” to include “qualified
interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered
materials available to individuals with hearing impairments.”37 The DOJ
recently amended its regulations implementing Title II of the ADA. The
amended regulations, which took effect March 15, 2011, set forth a
number of specific examples of “auxiliary aids and services,” including
[q]ualified interpreters on-site or through video remote
interpreting (VRI) services; notetakers; real-time
computer-aided transcription services; written materials;
exchange of written notes; telephone handset amplifiers;
assistive listening devices; assistive listening systems;
telephones compatible with hearing aids; closed caption
decoders; open and closed captioning, including realtime captioning; voice, text, and video-based
telecommunications products and systems, including
text telephones (TTYs), videophones, and captioned
telephones, or equally effective telecommunications
devices; videotext displays; accessible electronic and
information technology; or other effective methods of
making aurally delivered information available to
individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing.38
A number of these “auxiliary aids and services” are particularly
appropriate for courtroom settings. Qualified sign language interpreters
who are familiar with legal concepts and can communicate them in sign
language will often be the most effective auxiliary aid for a deaf or hard
of hearing individual who primarily communicates in sign language.
Real-time computer-aided transcription services are effective for those
with appropriate reading comprehension skills. Assistive listening
systems or devices, such as infrared systems or FM systems, could be
appropriate for others who have some degree of hearing. Oral
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2010).
Id. § 35.160(b)(1).
37
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006).
38
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,
75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,177 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35).
35
36
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interpreters could be an effective accommodation for those who lipread
but lack strong reading comprehension skills.
The DOJ regulations provide that the public entity must give
“primary consideration” to the type of accommodation requested by the
individual with the disability in determining what accommodation is
appropriate.39 It would not help a deaf person who lipreads and does
not communicate in sign language, for instance, for a public entity to
provide that person with a sign language interpreter. Likewise, real-time
transcription might not be an appropriate accommodation for a person
who communicates in sign language and is far more accustomed to
receiving information in sign language than any other method. Thus, the
public entity must provide deference to the type of accommodation
requested by the deaf or hard of hearing individual in order to ensure
that the accommodation provided is appropriate to the person making
the request.
The amended DOJ regulations set forth that required level of
deference:
The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure
effective communication will vary in accordance with
the method of communication used by the individual;
the nature, length, and complexity of the communication
involved; and the context in which the communication is
taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary
aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give
primary consideration to the requests of individuals
with disabilities. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids
and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a
timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the
privacy and independence of the individual with a
disability.40
The cost of these accommodations must be borne by the public entity,
not by the deaf or hard of hearing lawyer seeking the accommodation.
As the DOJ regulation explains, “[a] public entity may not place a
28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2).
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,
75 Fed. Reg. at 56,184. The amended regulations also provide that “[a] public entity shall
not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him
or her” and “shall not rely on [any] adult accompanying [the] individual with a disability
[to provide interpreting services], except . . . [w]here the individual with [the] disability
specifically requests that the accompanying adult [provide the services and such
interpreting would be] appropriate under the circumstances.” Id.
39
40
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surcharge on a particular individual with a disability . . . to cover the cost
of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program
accessibility, that are required to provide that individual . . . with the
non-discriminatory treatment required by the Act.”41
The federal Judicial Conference policy covering accommodations in
federal courts is similar to the ADA. Under the federal policy, the
definition of “auxiliary aids and services” tracks that under the ADA by
instructing federal courts to provide “qualified interpreters, assistive
listening devices or systems, or other effective methods of making
aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing
impairments” and to give “primary consideration to a participant’s
choice of auxiliary aid or service.”42 The policy defines “primary
consideration” to mean that
the court is to honor a participant’s choice of auxiliary
aid or service, unless it can show that another equally
effective means of communication is available, or that
the use of the means chosen would result in a
fundamental alteration in the nature of the court
proceeding or in undue financial or administrative
burden.43
The federal policy also mentions computer-assisted real-time
reporting. The policy explains that where a court determines such realtime reporting to be appropriate, it “is one of the services that may be
provided under these guidelines.”44 However, the policy explains that
such real-time reporting is limited to the purpose of providing
accommodations for those with communications disabilities. It is not
intended to serve as an official court record and is not required to offer
features such as key word searches for the benefit of the attorneys or
parties using the service.45
D. New or More Advanced Accommodations Are Now Available
Many accommodations that are available to deaf and hard of hearing
participants in the judicial system today have been available for many
years.
Sign language interpreters, notetakers, open and closed
captioning, and other similar accommodations have been used for years
41
42
43
44
45

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f).
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to allow deaf people to access the court system. However, a number of
new technologies have emerged or become significantly more advanced
in the last decade that, if properly made available, could ensure that no
deaf or hard of hearing individual will lack the ability to participate
meaningfully in courtroom proceedings.
1.

Real-Time Transcriptions

One significant development is the advent of real-time transcription
services, such as Communication Access Realtime Translation (“CART”).
A real-time transcription is a near simultaneous written transcript of the
proceedings. The provider uses stenography shorthand to capture
everything that is said in the courtroom. Computer software, such as
LiveNote or CaseView programs, converts that shorthand into standard
English. The recipient can view the resulting transcription on a
computer screen in real time.46 While real-time transcription is used in
classrooms, conferences, and conventions, and to caption live television
broadcasts, Broadway plays, and sporting events, this technology is
particularly appropriate for use in a courtroom setting. In many courts,
court reporters already record proceedings by stenographic means in
order to prepare verbatim transcripts of court proceedings. With the
appropriate hardware and software, the court reporter could provide the
transcription of the proceedings in real-time for the benefit of deaf and
hard of hearing participants.47
It has become more and more common in recent years for lawyers
and judges who are not deaf to use real-time transcriptions during court
proceedings. A judge can use a real-time transcription to look back at
earlier testimony during a lawyer’s examination of a witness. A lawyer
can make a private annotation on the real-time transcription for use
during cross-examination, closing argument, or jury instructions.48

See Communication Access Realtime Translation, NAT’L CT. REPS. ASS’N,
http://ncraonline.org/NR/rdonlyres/6556B2C5-B5DB-4DD9-8393-743EFE5933A4/0/
CARTmarketingbrochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) (providing a brochure that gives a
useful overview of realtime captioning and CART services).
47
See Certified Realtime Reporter (CRR), NAT’L CT. REPS. ASS’N, http://ncraonline.org/
certification/Certification/crr/default.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) (explaining what a
certified real-time reporter service is and how it functions). Not every court reporter can
provide a meaningful real-time feed. To provide an effective real-time transcript, a
reporter must be able to provide a high degree of accuracy on the fly without going back to
correct errors. See id. (explaining that the National Court Reporters Association requires
96% accuracy for five minutes at a speed of 180 words per minute for a court reporter to be
certified as a real-time reporter).
48
See Fredric I. Lederer, Wired: What We’ve Learned About Courtroom Technology, 24 CRIM.
JUST. 18, 23 (2010) (explaining the benefits of courtroom technology).
46
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Many lawyers now use real-time transcription services at depositions to
get a live transcript of the deponent’s testimony.
In short, independent of the benefit such transcriptions provide for a
deaf or hard of hearing individual, these real-time transcriptions are
becoming much more prevalent throughout the legal profession. As a
result, the services offered by real-time reporters are becoming
increasingly available and are not limited to situations in which a fulltime court reporter is present in a courtroom to record the proceedings.
Even courts that do not routinely record proceedings via use of court
reporters can hire them on an as-needed basis to provide transcription
services for the deaf. Such services can also be provided remotely, by
court reporters not physically present in the courtroom. Automated realtime transcription is a work-in-progress, but it offers the promise of
making real-time transcriptions available to more individuals at
substantially lower costs.49
With emerging technologies, however, come significantly more
advanced technological know-how to operate them.
Real-time
transcription requires that the court reporter’s stenography machine
“talk to” the laptop computer on which the deaf individual is reading the
real-time transcription. Based on personal experience, if the program
does not work at the outset, the court reporters and court technical
specialists are not always able to get the transcription program to work.
This problem, however, should disappear with more frequent training
and experience in these programs.
2.

Remote Video Interpreting

A second significant development has been the rise of remote
interpreting services. Sign language interpreters have long been used in
courtrooms to provide accommodations to those who communicate via
sign language. But one of the biggest problems confronting those who
need such interpreters is their lack of availability. A deaf defendant who
shows up in court for arraignment may find that there is no sign
language interpreter available at that time to provide interpreting
services. Remote video interpreting obviates the need for a court system
to have a qualified sign language interpreter on-site or on-call at all times
by permitting use of interpreters who are in a different location.
The amended DOJ regulations implementing Title II specifically
recognize video remote interpreting as an appropriate auxiliary aid and
service. Those regulations make clear, however, that the video and
audio feed must be sufficient to permit “high-quality video images.”
49

Id.
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The regulation provides that a public entity that chooses to provide
remote interpreting services
shall ensure that it provides—
(1) Real-time, full-motion video and audio over a
dedicated
high-speed,
wide-bandwidth
video
connection or wireless connection that delivers highquality video images that do not produce lags, choppy,
blurry, or grainy images, or irregular pauses in
communication;
(2) A sharply delineated image that is large enough
to display the interpreter's face, arms, hands, and
fingers, and the participating individual’s face, arms,
hands, and fingers, regardless of his or her body
position;
(3) A clear, audible transmission of voices; and
(4) Adequate training to users of the technology
and other involved individuals so that they may quickly
and efficiently set up and operate the [remote video
services].50
Although remote video interpreting obviates the need for a sign
language interpreter to be physically present and therefore could make
remote interpreting more widespread, it requires that the public entity
make a significant investment in technological capabilities in order to
meet the standard set forth in the DOJ regulations.
3.

Assistive Listening Technology

A deaf or hard of hearing lawyer may also be able to use assistive
listening devices to practice in a courtroom. In a recent article, a deaf
lawyer with a cochlear implant described handling a bench trial using
assistive listening devices.
The judge and witnesses spoke into
microphones placed in front of them, while opposing counsel used
portable wireless microphones that could be clipped onto their ties or
suit jackets. Each of these microphones broadcast to an infrared
transmitter, which in turn transmitted to a portable receiver connected to
the speech processor of the deaf lawyer’s cochlear implant.51

50
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,
75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,184 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35).
51
See Brian D. Sheridan, Hearing at the Hearing: Using Assistive Listening Technology in the
Courtroom, 84 MICH. B.J. 32, 33 (2005).
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Other similar assistive listening devices are available and can be
modified in ways specific to the individual recipient. For instance, if the
deaf lawyer used a hearing aid rather than a cochlear implant, the
transmission from the infrared transmitter could have fed into a
neckloop, which allows a hearing aid containing a telecoil (or T-coil)
switch to pick up the transmission.52 While amplification and FM
technologies are not new, the advances in wireless technology and the
clarity of the sound that is being transmitted make this a much better
option for those who are deaf or hard of hearing than it was in the past.
4.

Universal Design Principles

Courtrooms today are being designed or retrofitted with “universal
design” principles in mind, meaning that all participants can take
Many trial courtrooms,
advantage of the technologies offered.53
particularly in federal courts across the country, are now high-tech.
They have flat-screen monitors for counsel, judges, witnesses, and often
jurors to view presentations in opening and closing statements,
documents shown to the witnesses, and other evidence presented at
trial.54 These technologies allow all participants in the courtroom—
whether deaf or hearing—to benefit. As noted above, some courtrooms
offer real-time captioning to all participants, including the lawyers,
judges, and jurors. Thus, regardless of whether a deaf or hard of hearing
person is a participant in the court proceeding, all participants can take
advantage of the real-time transcription to read as well as hear the
testimony of a witness.
The deaf lawyer with the cochlear implant who used assistive
listening technology at trial noted that the transmission that was fed to
his cochlear implant was also transmitted to loudspeakers placed around
the courtroom, thus benefiting all the people in the courtroom, including
the court reporter and spectators.55 The lawyer also noted that the court
subsequently acquired additional wireless microphones and has used
them in trials not involving any deaf or hard of hearing individuals
because they provide for greater ease in understanding what others have
said.56

Id.
See Peter Blanck, Ann Wilichowski & James Schmeling, Disability Civil Rights Law and
Policy: Accessible Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 825, 836 (2004).
54
See Lederer, supra note 48, at 19–20 (reporting an estimate from the Department of
Justice that 95% of federal trial courtrooms are high-tech).
55
Sheridan, supra note 51, at 33.
56
Id.
52
53
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Although these technologies are now more widely available and
new state of the art technologies for providing accommodations will
emerge, the DOJ regulations do not mandate that public entities adopt
new and emerging technologies to provide accommodations. In the
notes to the definition of “auxiliary aids and services,” the DOJ
regulation notes that “although the definition [of auxiliary aids and
services] would include ‘state of the art’ devices, public entities are not
required to use the newest or most advanced technologies as long as the
auxiliary aid or service that is selected affords effective
communication.”57
II. THE LAW AS APPLIED TO DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING PARTICIPANTS
A. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Lawyer
In 2007, it was reported that there are at least 170 deaf lawyers
practicing in the United States.58 That number is likely to grow
substantially as the legal rights enshrined in the ADA have produced a
new generation of deaf and hard of hearing individuals with greater
access to education and other resources and who are now attending and
graduating from law school in greater numbers than ever before. Given
the relatively few deaf lawyers, it is not surprising that Kentucky and
Florida (the states in which Mosier and Harrison requested
accommodations) do not have established policies for providing
accommodations to deaf and hard of hearing lawyers. Nevertheless, the
ADA and the Rehab Act plainly require the states to provide such
accommodations.
At the time that she first requested a sign language interpreter for
court appearances, Mosier worked for Kentucky’s Department of Public
Advocacy.59 Initially and for three months thereafter, the Kentucky
Office of Vocational Rehabilitation provided sign language interpreters
for Mosier’s court appearances.60 At the end of those three months,
however, Kentucky refused to provide further sign language interpreters
for Mosier’s court appearances.61 Mosier later left the Department of
Public Advocacy and became a solo practitioner.62 In 2008, Mosier
brought a complaint against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its
28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A, comment to § 35.104 (2010).
See, e.g., Mike, Deaf Judges, KOKONUT PUNDIT (July 15, 2007, 1:18 AM),
http://kokonutpundits.blogspot.com/2007/07/deaf-judges.html.
59
Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II), 675 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 696.
57
58
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Administrative Office of the Courts, and several individuals in their
official capacities for failing to provide qualified sign language
interpreters for her court appearances. Mosier sought injunctive and
monetary relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.63 The Commonwealth of Kentucky raised
a multitude of defenses in two motions to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment, all of which were rejected.
First, defendants argued that a Kentucky statute that authorizes
interpreters for the deaf or hard of hearing provides that such qualified
interpreters shall be provided for those who are “parties, jurors, or
witnesses.”64 Based on this statute, defendants argued that it could not
provide interpreters for “attorneys.” Indeed, the Administrative Office
of the Kentucky Courts had adopted an administrative policy that it does
“not provide interpreting services for attorneys, public defenders, law
enforcement officers, jail officials, other state agency employees, social
workers or mental health workers.”65 The court rejected this argument,
finding that a different Kentucky statute required recipients of
government funding to ensure equal access for individuals with a
disability and that it would make no sense to require the government to
provide such access but not to authorize the expenditure necessary to
comply with the statute.66
Second, defendants argued that Mosier’s claims fell within Title I,
rather than Title II, of the ADA and that her employer was therefore
obligated to provide her with accommodations.67 Since Mosier was selfemployed, the argument boiled down to the contention that Mosier
should bear the cost of her own accommodations. The court rejected that
argument, finding that Mosier’s claim was properly asserted under Title
II because the broad language “services, programs or activities” under
Title II encompassed the court proceedings for which she sought
accommodations.68
Third, defendants argued that Mosier’s ADA claim was barred by
the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s sovereign immunity.69 The Eleventh
Amendment grants the States immunity from “any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted . . . by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
Id. at 694.
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss at 3–4 Mosier II, 675
F. Supp. 2d 693 (No. 08-CV-184-KSF) (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30A.410(1) (2008)).
65
Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
66
Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier I), 640 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (citing KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 344.120–.130 (2008)).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 878–79.
69
Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 699.
63
64
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or Subject of any Foreign State.”70 Despite the absence of any reference
to immunity for suits brought by a State’s own citizens for violations of
federal law, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment to grant such immunity based on the sovereignty the States
enjoyed prior to the Constitution’s ratification, so long as the States have
not consented to such a suit.71
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits by citizens against state
officials for prospective injunctive relief.72 The Mosier court therefore
rejected the Commonwealth’s claim of immunity as a defense to Mosier’s
request for injunctive relief.73 The Eleventh Amendment also does not
bar suits by citizens against States for money damages in the area of
access to judicial services pursuant to Title II of the ADA. The Supreme
Court considered this precise question in 2004 in Tennessee v. Lane. In
Lane, a paraplegic was scheduled to appear in court to answer criminal
charges.74 He arrived at the courthouse at the time of his scheduled
appearance, but the courtroom was on the second floor of a county
courthouse that had no elevator.75 After Lane refused to suffer the
indignity of crawling or being carried up the stairs (as he had for a prior
hearing), he was arrested and jailed for failure to appear at his hearing.76
Lane subsequently sued the State for money damages under Title II of
the ADA. Based on its findings that “Congress enacted Title II against a
backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state
services and programs, including systematic deprivations of
fundamental rights” and that decisions of other courts had
“demonstrate[d] a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the
administration of justice,”77 the Supreme Court held that Congress had
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity “as it applies to the class of
cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”78 Thus,
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–73 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 710–13 (1999) (“[T]he
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the
authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a
fundamental aspect of [their] sovereignty . . . .”).
72
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
73
Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 699.
74
541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004).
75
Id. at 513–14.
76
Id. at 514.
77
Id. at 524, 525 (citing, for example, Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1132–33 (5th Cir.
1978) (deaf criminal defendant denied interpretive services), opinion withdrawn as moot, 573
F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Schaim, 600 N.E.2d 661, 672 (Ohio 1992) (same); People v.
Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (same)).
78
Id. at 533–34.
70
71
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the Mosier court, applying the holding of Tennessee v. Lane, held that
Congress had validly abrogated the Commonwealth’s immunity from
suit in cases “implicating the accessibility of judicial services,” and
therefore Mosier could bring a claim against the Commonwealth for
money damages for a violation of Title II of the ADA.79
Fourth, the defendants in Mosier argued that they did not
intentionally discriminate against Mosier based on her disability, but
rather based on her status as an attorney because they were statutorily
barred from providing interpreting services to anyone not a party,
witness, or juror.80 The court rejected this argument, holding that a
showing of discriminatory intent was not necessary to sustain a claim for
violation of the ADA.81 Discriminatory intent is necessary only to
sustain a claim for monetary damages under the ADA, not a claim for
injunctive relief.82
Fifth, defendants argued that the Rehab Act claim failed because
Mosier could not meet the requirement that she was denied an
interpreter solely because of her disability as opposed to her status as an
attorney.83 The court held that Mosier’s claim was based on her being
treated differently than hearing attorneys with regard to access to court
services, and that whether defendants discriminated against her on the
basis of her disability was a question for the trier of fact.84
Mosier also moved for summary judgment on her own claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The court held that Mosier qualified for
protection under the ADA and the Rehab Act, rejecting defendants’
argument that Mosier was not entitled to such accommodations as an
attorney.85 The court left for trial, however, the questions of whether
Mosier’s requested accommodation was a reasonable one and whether
the State’s services were “readily accessible to and useable by
individuals with disabilities.”86
Following the court’s ruling, the parties reached a settlement of
Mosier’s claim. Without admitting any violation of the ADA or Rehab
Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II) , 675 F. Supp. 2d 693, 699 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier I), 640 F. Supp. 2d 857, 877–78 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
81
Id. at 878.
82
See, e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).
83
Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 698–99.
84
Id. Defendants also made a variety of procedural arguments not discussed here, all of
which were rejected. See Mosier v. Kentucky, No. 08-184-KSF, 2008 WL 4191510, at *2–3
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief
under the ADA or the Rehab Act); Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 696–97 (denying motion for
summary judgment based on lack of standing); id. at 697–98 (denying motion for summary
judgment on statute of limitations grounds).
85
Mosier II, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
86
Id. at 701.
79
80
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Act, the defendants—as well as Mosier—recited that they entered into
the settlement agreement “to further enhance access to the court system
for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing.”87 As part of the settlement,
the Kentucky Courts of Justice agreed to change their accommodations
policy to “provide interpreting services or auxiliary aids and services, at
its own expense, for eligible attorneys, but only for in-court proceedings
and court-ordered proceedings in which court personnel are directly
involved.”88 An “eligible attorney” is defined as “an attorney who is a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because he or she is
deaf or hard of hearing and who has complied with the procedures
promulgated by the [Kentucky Courts of Justice] for requesting an
interpreter or auxiliary aids.”89 The settlement provides that the
presiding judge in a court proceeding in which an eligible attorney
requests accommodations may request written documentation
establishing that the attorney is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA.90 As under the ADA regulations, “the Presiding Judge will give
primary consideration to the specific auxiliary aid or service requested
by that attorney,” but the eligible attorney must engage in an interactive
process with the court to permit the presiding judge to evaluate how to
provide interpreting services or auxiliary aids and services.91
Interestingly, and consistent with defendants’ argument that
Mosier’s employer should pay for the accommodation under Title I of
the ADA, the settlement agreement permits the Administrative Office of
the Courts to ask for reimbursement from the eligible attorney’s
employer, though it does not guarantee that any reimbursement will be
provided.92 Mosier herself was deemed to have qualified as an eligible
attorney without the need to submit verifying documentation confirming
her disability, to have permanently established the need for interpreting
services or auxiliary aids, and to be provided interpreting services or

87
Settlement Agreement and General Release of All Claims, Recitals at E, Mosier II, 675
F. Supp. 2d 693 (No. 08-CV-184-KSF) [hereinafter Mosier Settlement Agreement].
88
Id. at Covenants at II.B.1.
89
Id. at II.B.3.
90
Id. at II.B.4.
91
Id. at II.B.6–7.
92
Id. at II.B.11. Because Title I of the ADA requires an employer (who falls within the
definition provided in the ADA) to provide reasonable accommodations to its employees,
see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) & (b)(5)(A), the Administrative Office of the Courts evidently
believes that the employer should accept joint responsibility for the provision of
accommodations. The ADA does not provide any guidance on the question of joint
responsibility.
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auxiliary aids pursuant to the revised policy.93 Mosier also received a
payment of $120,000 from defendants as part of the settlement.94
Like Mosier, Harrison brought an ADA claim after denial of his
request for real-time transcription. In his criminal defense practice,
Harrison requested and received real-time court reporters to transcribe
criminal trials and other hearings in the First, Seventh, and Tenth
Judicial Circuits.95 However, he was denied similar accommodations in
the Ninth and Eighteenth Judicial Circuits.96 In December 2006, Harrison
brought suit against the Office of the State Courts Administrator and
various related individuals and entities for failure to provide real-time
court reporters for Harrison’s criminal trials and court appearances.
Harrison sought injunctive and monetary relief for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.97
Harrison moved for a preliminary injunction seeking a court order
directing that defendants provide him with a real-time court reporter for
state court criminal jury trials until the court made a final ruling.98 The
court denied his request, finding that he had not established a likelihood
of success on the merits.99 The court also found that he had not
established a likelihood of irreparable injury because he had failed to
provide evidence of any upcoming jury trials in which he would need
accommodations.100
Like Mosier, Harrison settled his case with the state. Without
admitting any liability or any violation of the ADA, the State of Florida
agreed to provide Harrison with “Real-time Transcription Services” at its
own expense “in criminal trials in county and circuit court” and to
ensure that the court reporter “shall provide a laptop and all
connectivity to Plaintiff for use in the criminal trial.”101 The agreement
Id. at II.B.4, 6, 8 & II.D.
Id. at IV.A.
95
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 21.
96
Id. ¶ 22.
97
Harrison v. Office of the State Courts Adm’r, No. 6:06-cv-1878, 2007 WL 1576351, at *1
(M.D. Fla. May 30, 2007).
98
Id. at *1, *5.
99
Id. at *6. That denial was based on procedural defects in Harrison’s papers; he had not
sued the proper state officials and his state law claims for breach of contract were barred by
Florida’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at *3–5.
100
Id. at *6.
101
Settlement Agreement at III.A Harrison v. Office of the State Courts Adm’r, No. 6:06cv-01878 (M.D. Fla. settled Oct. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Harrison Settlement Agreement],
available at http://www.law.miami.edu/disabilityservices/pdf/settlement_agreement.pdf.
The agreement specified that Harrison would be entitled to the provision of real-time
transcription services in criminal trials
while he has an impairment which, without mitigating measures,
substantially limits a major life activity, consistent with decisional case
93
94
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provided that Harrison could request real-time transcription services in
other criminal proceedings and such requests would be handled on a
case-by-case basis.102 In addition, Harrison received the sum of $19,600
from defendants or others on their behalf.103
B. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Judge
Richard Brown is the chief judge of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,
the state’s intermediate appellate court.104 Brown was elected to that
court in 1978 and has served for the last thirty-three years. He is also
deaf.105
Brown lost the hearing in his right ear after a childhood bout with
the measles; he lost his hearing in his left ear in 1983, when an operation
to remove a brain tumor left him deaf.106 Prior to the surgery, which he
knew would likely leave him deaf, Brown worried that his career as a
judge would be over.107 Brown received a cochlear implant and took
lipreading classes. He soon realized that he could continue to serve as a
judge with appropriate accommodations.108 In court in the 1980s, he
used a computer captioning system, which delivered text after a sevensecond delay. Advances in technology have made life in the courtroom
easier for him. In addition to lipreading and an updated cochlear
implant, Brown now uses real-time CART services.109 Brown has a
judicial assistant who used to be a court reporter and is proficient in

law. Should Plaintiff undergo any treatment which mitigates his
hearing impairment such that he no longer is substantially limited in a
major life activity, he will not be entitled to the accommodation
provided in this Settlement Agreement.
Id. at II.D.1. The Agreement reflects the ruling in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 493 (1999), that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be
determined with reference to the ameliorating effects of mitigating measures. Congress
overruled Sutton when it enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554. The
Amendment provided that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures.” Id. § 3(4)(E)(i).
102
Harrison Settlement Agreement, supra note 101, at III.A.
103
Id. at III.B.
104
Karen Sloan, Wisconsin Judge Overcomes Hearing Impairment, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 11, 2010, at
20.
105
Id.
106
Id.; see also People in the News, THIRD BRANCH, Winter 2000, at 19, 20,
http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/winter00.pdf.
107
Sloan, supra note 104, at 20.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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providing CART services.110 He believes that using CART has made him
a better judge “since he can take a few extra seconds to mull over
important motions.”111
At least two other deaf or hard of hearing lawyers, with appropriate
accommodations, have also served as judges. In Delaware, Norman
Barron served as associate judge on the Superior Court of Delaware.112
He was appointed to a twelve-year term starting in 1989.113 Barron was
deaf in one ear since 1968 and lost his hearing completely in his other ear
in 1997, as a result of Meniere’s disease, a rare inner-ear disorder. Barron
uses hearing aids, an FM system, and real-time captioning.114 In an
interview in 1998, Barron said that his hearing loss “is severe enough
today that I could not get by without real-time reporting.”115 In that
interview, Barron said that he believed that courts “have not been in the
forefront when it comes to accessibility,” but that since the passage of the
ADA, they have been in “catch-up mode to ensure courtroom
accessibility for all of our citizens.”116 At the time the article was
published, Barron had taken a leave of absence to get a cochlear
implant.117
In Illinois, Theodore Burtzos served as associate judge of the Cook
County Circuit Court in the mid-1990s.118 Burtzos lost his hearing in
1986 as a result of Meniere’s disease.119 Burtzos received a cochlear
implant and uses real-time captioning.120 Of these three judges, only
Burtzos became a judge after losing all of his hearing.
Given the fact that federal judges have life tenure and often serve
until very advanced ages, it is likely that there are a number of other
judges who are hard of hearing and use various types of
accommodations such as amplification devices to assist them in serving
as judges. Based on publicly available information, however, these
judges appear not to self-identify as deaf or hard of hearing. The lack of
deaf judges who identify as being deaf is likely the result of the relatively
Id.
Id.
112
Barry Strassler, Delaware’s Hearing Impaired Judge, SILENT NEWS, June 30, 1998.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Pat Clawson, Deaf Lawyer Named New Circuit Judge, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1995, at 3; Judy
Hevrdejs & Mike Conklin, It Looks Like Lawyer Ted Burtzos Again Will Make History, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 8, 1995, at 16.
119
Clawson, supra note 118, at 3; Hevrdejs & Conklin, supra note 118, at 16.
120
Clawson, supra note 118, at 3; Andrew Fegelman, Deaf Lawyer Among 13 New Cook
Judges, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1995, at 4.
110
111
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few deaf lawyers in the legal profession. There are far more blind
judges, for instance, than deaf judges, particularly when it comes to the
federal courts.121
But with the benefit of the accommodations available today to
ensure that deaf judges—like other deaf participants in the judicial
system—can follow everything that is happening in the courtroom, there
should be no concern about deaf people not being able to perform the
role of a judge. In particular, a concern has been raised about the ability
of a deaf judge to sit as fact-finder and assess the credibility of a witness
based on, for instance, the inflection in his voice or pauses in his answers
to questions on the witness stand.
The same criticisms were raised about blind judges. When Richard
C. Casey was nominated for a federal judgeship, he was asked during
his confirmation hearing if he would be able to ascertain the credibility
of a witness if he could not see the witness.122 He responded that there
was no disadvantage in being blind since the sighted might be distracted
by a pretty face, hair, or clothing.123 “What it really comes down to is
whether their story strings together. . . . So I see the real world without
ever seeing it.”124 Similarly, a deaf judge might not be able to hear
inflection in a voice or stumbling in an answer from a witness but could
focus on numerous visual cues and on the words used by a witness to
determine whether the “story strings together.”125
It is not surprising that there are no lawsuits involving deaf judges
suing over lack of accommodations. Because a judge exercises a great
deal of control over his or her courtroom, a deaf judge could arrange for
whatever accommodation he or she deemed most appropriate to assist
him or her in following the court proceedings. A deaf judge has the
advantage of being able to stop a trial or court proceeding if there were
any problems with the accommodation.

121
For example, the late Richard Conway Casey (United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York), David Tatel (United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit), and Bruce Selya (United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit). There are also numerous blind state court judges, such as Richard Teitelman
(Supreme Court of Missouri).
122
Larry Neumeister, Judge in Abortion Trial Overcomes Personal Obstacles in Successful
Career, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 11, 2004, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/
20040411-1053-abortionlawsuit-judge.html.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
See id.
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C. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Criminal Defendant
An innocent deaf man spent seven nights in jail in 2005 solely because
there was not an interpreter available to assist him during
arraignment.126 Humberto Suarez was mistakenly arrested on a Monday
evening in August 2005, on a warrant that had been issued for another
person.127 He was brought to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Courthouse
on Tuesday morning for arraignment and placed in a holding cell.128
About an hour and a half later, a police officer “apparently realized that
[he] was deaf and taped a sign reading ‘DEAF’ to the front of his shirt.
No other action was taken to alert the court to Suarez’s [deafness].”129
When Suarez was brought to the courtroom, the court clerk did not
notice the sign and no one on the court staff realized that Suarez needed
an interpreter until it was too late to obtain one. An interpreter was
requested for Wednesday morning and Suarez was returned to jail.130
Suarez, for reasons not clear in the record, was put on medical hold
at the jail and not delivered to court for arraignment on Wednesday,
Thursday, or Friday mornings.131 He was held over the weekend until
court opened for session the next Monday morning.132 Suarez was
brought back to court, but the sheriff’s department did not contact the
court in advance to arrange for an interpreter.133 Instead, Suarez simply
arrived with the “DEAF” sign taped to his shirt.134 Again, the court staff
did not become aware of his presence until it was too late that day to
arrange for an interpreter.135 Suarez was returned to jail on Monday
evening and an interpreter was arranged for the next day.136 Suarez was
finally released on Tuesday when he was arraigned with an American
Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter present, at which point it quickly
became clear that the police had arrested the wrong man.137
Suarez sued the Superior Court of California for money damages
under Title II of the ADA.138 As noted above, a plaintiff seeking to
126
Suarez v. Superior Court, 283 F. App’x 470, 471–72 (9th Cir. 2008) (concurring
opinion).
127
Id. at 472.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 471.
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recover money damages must prove intentional discrimination on the
part of the defendant.139 The district court granted summary judgment
to defendant, finding no evidence of intentional discrimination, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed that ruling.140 Notwithstanding the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling that Suarez could not show intentional discrimination,
no one disputed that Suarez, as a deaf criminal defendant facing
arraignment, had the right to an interpreter.
Given the threat to liberty inherent in a criminal prosecution, courts
recognize that due process rights are implicated when a criminal
defendant is unable to hear or participate meaningfully in the criminal
proceedings. It has been settled that the constitutional guarantee of due
process in a criminal trial “is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to
defend against the State’s accusations” and that this guarantee
encompasses both the rights of a defendant to confront witnesses against
him and to assist in his own defense.141 In the context of a criminal
defendant with a disability, the Supreme Court noted in Tennessee v. Lane
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “guarantee to a criminal
defendant such as respondent Lane the ‘right to be present at all stages
of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the
proceedings’” and a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” by removing
obstacles to his full participation in judicial proceedings.142
A number of courts have held that a non-English speaking criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to an interpreter.143 In one leading
case, the conviction of a Spanish-speaking defendant was vacated
because he was tried and convicted of murder in New York state court
without the assistance of an interpreter for much of the trial.144 Finding
that in the absence of an interpreter, “most of the trial must have been a
babble of voices” for the defendant, the court held that the trial “lacked
the basic and fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”145 The court held as follows:

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Suarez, 283 F. App’x at 471.
141
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
142
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
143
See, e.g., United States v. Yee Soon Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1456 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620,
634 (7th Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 387 (2d Cir.
1970).
144
Negron, 434 F.2d at 387.
145
Id. at 388, 389.
139
140
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Considerations of fairness, the integrity of the factfinding process, and the potency of our adversary
system of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a
defendant who is not present at his own trial . . . . And it
is equally imperative that every criminal defendant—if
the right to be present is to have meaning—possess
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”146
Compared with the abundant case law addressing the rights of nonEnglish speakers to an interpreter, “[t]here is little case law addressing
the issue of whether a criminal defendant who is deaf or hearingimpaired has a constitutional right to an interpreter or some other
assistance.”147 One of the leading cases is Ferrell v. Estelle, a 1978 case in
which the Fifth Circuit ordered a new trial for a deaf criminal defendant
who was denied stenographers to transcribe the spoken words and was
instead given frequent recesses for the defendant’s lawyer to confer with
him as to what was happening at trial.148 Noting that the Constitution
requires “that a defendant sufficiently understand the proceedings
against him to be able to assist in his own defense,” the Fifth Circuit held
that the rights of the deaf criminal defendant “were reduced below the
constitutional minimum.”149 Nevertheless, some courts have been
reluctant to declare that a deaf criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to an interpreter.150
Even if there were no constitutional right of access to the court, the
statutory bases discussed above would still apply. In federal court, the
Court Interpreter Act applies to all cases involving a deaf criminal
defendant, as a criminal prosecution in federal court must by definition
be instituted by the United States.151 Despite the concern that rights of
the deaf in federal court are protected only by judicial policy and not by
Id. at 389 (citations omitted) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1962)).
Phillips v. Miller, No. 01 Civ. 1175, 2000 WL 33650803, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2000).
148
568 F.2d 1128, 1129 (5th Cir. 1978).
149
Id. at 1132, 1133.
150
See, e.g., DuQuin v. Cunningham, No. 07CV31, 2009 WL 899434, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
26, 2009) (“The Supreme Court has not held that a defendant has an absolute right to an
interpreter and that the failure to provide one at any stage of a criminal prosecution
violates the constitutional rights of the defendant regardless of whether the lack of an
interpreter actually prejudiced the defendant.”); Hoke v. Miller, No. 02-CV-0516, 2007 WL
2292992, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) (“Petitioner failed to cite and this Court could not
locate any established Supreme Court precedent indicating that due process demands that
specific accommodations be made to address a [criminal] defendant’s hearing
difficulties.”).
151
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
146
147
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federal law, that is not the case where a deaf criminal defendant is
involved. The ADA and Rehab Act also continue to protect the rights of
deaf criminal defendants in state courts.152
It is in the context of the deaf criminal defendant that the issue of
what accommodation is provided appears to be most significant. Under
these statutes, a defendant is not entitled to the accommodation of his
choice, merely a reasonable accommodation. Thus, requests by deaf
criminal defendants for multiple interpreters (one to interpret the
criminal proceedings and one to interpret conversations between the
deaf defendant and his counsel), deaf-relay interpreters, or consecutive
interpretation (rather than simultaneous interpretation) have been
denied.153 As one court described, “[a]lthough the [appellate court] may
be right that a deaf-relay interpreter could have been ‘the best’ solution
to appellant’s lack of hearing, it erred in concluding that the three
interpreters that the trial judge did use were constitutionally insufficient
to ensure her due process rights.”154
It is in this context as well that the concern for those deaf individuals
with minimal language skills is most prevalent:
There is a pervasive belief within the legal system that if
we put an interpreter in front of a deaf person, the
interpreter will instantly (and perfectly) convert spoken
language to the appropriate language for the deaf
person and the communication problem will be solved,
thereby freeing everyone from further worry or inquiry
and allowing business to proceed as usual.155
In reality, as several interesting articles have explored, deaf people with
minimal language skills have a far more difficult time obtaining
meaningful communication in criminal proceedings.156

152
See, e.g., Suarez v. Superior Court, 283 F. App’x 470, 471 (9th Cir. 2008) (no dispute
that plaintiff was entitled to an interpreter under the ADA).
153
See State v. Wright, 768 N.W.2d 512, 527 (S.D. 2009) (denying request for consecutive
interpretation); Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (denying
request for deaf-relay interpreter or certified deaf interpreter).
154
Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509.
155
Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, The Deaf Client: It Takes More Than a Sign—Part 1,
CHAMPION, June 2005, at 27.
156
Id. at 28; see also Brandon M. Tuck, Comment, Preserving Facts, Form, and Function
When a Deaf Witness with Minimal Language Skills Testifies in Court, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 905
(2010).
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D. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Civil Litigant
Joseph Popovich suffered from mild to moderate hearing loss.157 In
1990, Popovich’s ex-wife sought custody of their daughter by filing a
motion in the Domestic Relations Division of the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas (“DRD”), an arm of the State of Ohio.158 During
a hearing on that motion in August 1992, Popovich informed the referee
that he was having trouble hearing the proceedings.159 He was then
given an FM system to accommodate his hearing loss.160 Because the
headphones caused an ear infection, Popovich requested real-time
captioning to accommodate his disability.161 In the interim, Popovich—
believing the FM system was ineffective—filed a charge of
discrimination with the Department of Justice.162 In response to the DOJ
investigation, the DRD contended that it had met its burden by
providing the FM system.163 Not until October 1994—two years later—
did the court agree to provide Popovich with real-time captioning.164 He
was then permitted to visit his daughter, but for reasons that are unclear,
did not see her until the summer of 1997, five years after she had been
removed from his custody.165 She had by then turned sixteen.166
Popovich filed suit against the DRD in 1995, alleging that it
discriminated against him in violation of Title II of the ADA and
retaliated against him after he filed a discrimination charge against the
court with the DOJ.167 In April 1998, a jury returned a verdict for
Popovich and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of
$400,000.168 Based on the jury’s finding, the court awarded injunctive
relief: (1) requiring the defendants to provide real-time captioning for
Popovich in the state custody matter; (2) enjoining the defendants from
discriminating against him in connection with providing any auxiliary
aids; and (3) enjoining the defendants from retaliating against him.169 On
appeal to the Sixth Circuit and a subsequent rehearing en banc, the court
157
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 227 F.3d 627, 630 (6th Cir.
2000).
158
Id. at 629.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 630.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 631.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
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addressed whether Ohio was immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, an issue subsequently resolved by the United States
Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Lane.170 In the en banc decision, the Sixth
Circuit vacated the jury verdict and remanded for a new trial on
Popovich’s claims of retaliation and unreasonable exclusion from
participation at trial.171 Following the Tennessee v. Lane decision,
Popovich moved to reinstate the $400,000 jury verdict; defendants
moved for summary judgment on the disability and retaliation claims.172
After both motions were denied,173 the case ultimately settled before
retrial.174
Popovich raises the interesting question of whether a deaf person is
entitled to the accommodation that he seeks (real-time transcription), as
opposed to a lesser accommodation that the court believes is sufficient
(an FM system). There was no dispute that the ADA governed the
request and that the court was obligated to provide some form of
accommodation. The issue was what accommodation was to be
provided. As noted above, the public entity must give “primary
consideration” to the accommodation requested but is not then obligated
to provide that accommodation.175 Nevertheless, the accommodation
provided must be adequate to permit the deaf individual meaningful
access to the court proceedings.
In a more recent case raising the issue of when an accommodation
request should be decided, a deaf man and his neighbor filed dueling
civil claims involving a trespass action.176 Neighbor Terry Strook
brought a complaint against Dean Kedinger, a deaf man; Kedinger
asserted cross-claims and counterclaims.177 Prior to the first hearing in
the case, Kedinger called the court via TTY to request a sign language
Id. at 641–42; see also Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d
808 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The author of this Article (along with other lawyers)
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Popovich to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003 in
Medical Board of California v. Hason, 537 U.S. 1231 (2003), a case dealing with Congress’s
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting Title II of the ADA. Hason was
withdrawn by Petitioner, the Medical Board of California, and the issue presented in Hason
was decided a year later by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Lane.
171
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 818.
172
Memorandum Opinion & Order at 4–5, Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Court of
Common Pleas (N.D. Ohio filed Sept. 30, 2004) (No. 1:95-cv-684) (on file with author);
Order at 1–2, Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Court of Common Pleas (N.D. Ohio filed Mar.
25, 2005) (No. 1:95-cv-684) (on file with author).
173
See id.
174
Order, Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (N.D. Ohio filed Oct.
12, 2006) (No. 1:95-cv-684).
175
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, comment to § 35.160 (2010).
176
Strook v. Kedinger, 766 N.W.2d 219, 221–22 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
177
Id. at 222.
170
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interpreter.178 When Kedinger was told that an interpreter would not be
provided, he indicated that he would not attend the hearing.179 Kedinger
subsequently filed a motion requesting a sign language interpreter and
stated that he would not appear at the hearing without an interpreter
being provided for him.180 No indication was ever provided to Kedinger
that his request for an interpreter would be considered at the hearing,
although he had been denied an interpreter for the hearing itself.181
Because Kedinger did not attend the hearing, the court struck his crossclaims and counterclaims.182
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Brown
(himself a deaf judge), held that the trial court had violated Title II of the
ADA, as well as state law and due process, by failing to hold a hearing to
address Kedinger’s request for a sign language interpreter.183 The Court
of Appeals held that once Kedinger properly notified the court that he
needed an interpreter, the trial court was required to act on that request
by obtaining an interpreter or setting a hearing date to determine the
need for the interpreter.184 Both “due process” and “the interests of
justice” demanded that Kedinger be notified that the court would
consider his request for an interpreter at the hearing.185
Also, the Court of Appeals held that it was an improper exercise of
discretion for the trial court to hear the interpreter issue together with
the substantive merits.186 If an accommodation is necessary, it should be
in place before the substantive proceeding.187 The court held that it puts
the disabled person between a “rock and the hard place” to have to
appear for “an important proceeding to determine liberty or property
interests not knowing whether the requested accommodation is going to
be granted.”188 Because courts are public entities “that must be
accessible to all,” the deaf person “should not have to worry about access
issues when preparing for the substantive hearing.”189
Finally, while the trial court appeared to view lipreading and written
notes as sufficient for Kedinger to participate in the proceedings, the
Court of Appeals held that such accommodations did not provide
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at 227–29.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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effective communication within the meaning of the ADA.190 As a result,
the appellate court required the trial court to conduct a hearing on
whether Kedinger should be provided with an interpreter.191 While
suggesting that perhaps a real-time reporter would be an appropriate
accommodation, the appellate court held, “[i]t is up to the circuit court
on remand to discover Kedinger’s capabilities and the best form of
communication and go from there.”192 Following that hearing, the trial
court would then have to redo the case from the beginning.193
E. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Juror
There has been a long and unfortunate history in this country of
discrimination against jurors on the basis of disability. Many states once
had statutes on the books that prevented deaf or hard of hearing
individuals from even serving as jurors. Now, the ADA covers jury duty
in state and local courts even where a state may still have a
discriminatory or exclusionary statute on its books.
In federal court, the Judicial Conference policy specifies that it does
not govern “[t]he determination of whether a prospective juror with a
communications disability is legally qualified to serve as a juror.”194
Rather, such a determination is left for “the judgment of the trial court
under the Jury Selection and Service Act. . . . However, where an
individual with a communications disability is found so qualified, a sign
language interpreter or other appropriate auxiliary aid or service should
be provided under these guidelines.”195
In contrast to the history of discrimination against the deaf and hard
of hearing in jury service, today there are few cases in which a juror who
is deaf or hard of hearing sues on the ground that he has been denied the
right to serve as a juror on account of his disability. It is possible that this
is because people are often happy to be excused from jury duty. Cases in
recent years concerning the rights of deaf and hard of hearing
individuals to sit on juries tend to arise because a criminal defendant
seeks to challenge the exclusion of a deaf or hard of hearing juror or
argues that the inclusion of such a juror denied him his right to a fair
trial.196
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 232.
192
Id. at 231.
193
Id. at 232.
194
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33.
195
Id.
196
See infra notes 197216 and accompanying text (identifying recent cases involving the
rights of deaf and hard of hearing jurors).
190
191
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A defendant in a 2005 case appealed his conviction because the court
had struck a deaf venireperson based on the court’s inability to
accommodate the venireperson’s disability.197 The trial court did not
find that the venireperson was unqualified to serve as a juror because of
his deafness.198 Rather, the deaf venireperson was struck because only
one sign language interpreter was available for voir dire when two were
needed to provide accommodations given that the interpreter could not
go for more than an hour without a break.199 The appellate court held
that the trial court did not have the discretion to strike the deaf
venireperson once the court had determined that he was qualified to
serve as a juror.200 Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the
conviction because the venireperson, who was juror number twentyseven, could not have been selected for the jury, which consisted of
twelve of the first twenty-four venirepersons.201
Likewise, a losing defendant in a 2006 disability discrimination case
challenged the trial court’s decision to strike a potential juror with a
hearing loss.202 At voir dire, the juror stated that she had ringing in her
ears and could not hear people when they turned around or lowered
their voices.203 She refused to use a hearing aid, indicated that she would
not benefit from moving to the front row, and had difficulty
understanding the judge who was sitting three or four feet away.204 The
Third Circuit therefore found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s
decision to excuse the juror.205
The cases discussed above stand for the relatively straightforward
proposition that a qualified juror whose deafness can be accommodated
should not be struck, while a juror who could not follow a trial even with
accommodations should be excused. A more troubling example comes
when a court excuses a deaf or hard of hearing juror based on a
determination that the evidence in a case requires some degree of
hearing to assess.
In a 2008 case, the challenge to the seating of a hard of hearing juror
turned on her ability to assess a recording of a 911 call.206 At voir dire,
the juror indicated that she needed to read lips in order to understand
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

State v. Wilson, 169 S.W.3d 571, 572–73 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Fendrick v. PPL Services Corp., 193 F. App’x 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
State v. Speer, 904 N.E.2d 956, 961 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
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what was being said at trial.207 She was moved to the front of the jury
box and, several times during trial, asked that counsel turn toward her
when they were speaking.208 The defendant moved for the juror to be
struck for cause but was denied.209 The defendant had four peremptory
challenges but used those to strike other potential jurors, thus leading to
the juror with the hearing loss being included in the jury panel.210
After the defendant was convicted, he complained that the trial court
erred in not striking for cause the juror with the hearing loss.211 The
appellate court found that the juror could not have properly evaluated
the evidence presented because much of the determination as to the
defendant’s guilt turned on a 911 tape that had been played for the
jury.212 Although the juror could read the words as they had been
transcribed, she could not “listen to appellant’s speech patterns, the
inflections in his voice, the pauses in the conversation, and many other
audio clues that would be meaningful only if actually heard.”213 The
written transcript of the tape, the court found, “would not have
conveyed the nuance and inflection imparted by the spoken words.”214
The court therefore held that the juror should have been excused for
cause and reversed the conviction.215
The court’s finding that a deaf or hard of hearing juror lacked the
ability to assess the credibility of the evidence is precisely the kind of
slippery slope that courts should take care to avoid. Few would dispute
that there are likely some cases where a deaf juror ought not to be on a
jury panel, such as a case where the guilt of a defendant turns on
whether his voice matches the voice on a recording (though with today’s
technology, it would likely be possible to render a visual comparison of
two different excerpts of sound).216 Nevertheless, courts should make
every effort to find a way for that juror to participate and meaningfully
weigh the evidence, so as to avoid the situation where deaf jurors
become routinely excused solely for reasons relating to their deafness.

Id. at 957.
Id. at 960.
209
Id. at 957.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 958.
212
Id. at 961.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Cf. Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 18 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1993) (recognizing
that it might be inappropriate for a blind juror to serve on a case with a substantial amount
of documentary evidence).
207
208
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The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Witness

Deaf and hard of hearing witnesses face an interesting limitation on
their right to accommodations in federal court. While the federal policy
adopted by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
includes “witnesses” in the definition of those who are entitled to
accommodations under the policy, a later section implies that
accommodations for deaf witnesses need to be provided only during the
duration of that individual’s participation in the proceeding.217 In a
section discussing real-time reporting as an appropriate accommodation,
the policy provides that “real-time reporting should be provided for only
as long as and for the specific purposes required by a participant: for
example, only for the duration of the deaf witness’s testimony.”218
On the one hand, the policy is sensible in that the deaf witness is
often going to participate in the judicial proceeding only when he is
testifying and therefore does not need accommodations before or after
his participation. In some proceedings witnesses may be barred from
viewing the testimony of other witnesses out of concern that they will
shape their testimony to that of other witnesses.219 This approach is
consistent with the federal policy’s treatment of spectators. As discussed
below, the policy denies spectators accommodations altogether, except in
situations in which the court determines that it is appropriate to provide
such accommodations.220 When a witness is not testifying, he is merely a
spectator, so it makes sense to treat him as one. On the other hand, the
witness is more than just a spectator. The witness is an interested
participant in the proceeding and may wish to be present for parts of the
proceeding that are relevant to his testimony to the extent that is
permissible.
In state court, the ADA and Rehab Act apply equally to deaf
witnesses and spectators as to other participants at trial.221 When a
witness is not testifying in a judicial proceeding, he is still entitled to an
accommodation as a spectator.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33.
Id.
219
FED. R. EVID. 615 (“At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its
own motion.”).
220
See infra Part II.G (discussing federal policy affecting deaf and hard of hearing
spectators).
221
See infra Part II.G (noting that Title II’s definition of “service, program or activity”
includes attending trial as an observer). But cf. In re McDonough, 457 Mass. 512, 519 n.16
(2010) (declining to reach whether Congress could validly require state courts to provide
reasonable accommodations for witnesses with disabilities because a state statute explicitly
required such accommodations).
217
218
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G. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Spectator
In June 2004, Bruce Rafford, who is hard of hearing, requested realtime captioning during his adult son’s civil commitment trial (brought in
county court) as a sexually violent predator.222 Rafford was a spectator
at the trial—he did not participate as a witness.223 The presiding
Snohomish County (Washington) Superior Court Judge Richard Thorpe
and county administrators declined to provide real-time captioning and
Following the
instead provided an assistive listening device.224
conclusion of his son’s trial, Rafford brought suit in federal court against
Thorpe and Snohomish County under Title II of the ADA, the Rehab Act,
and Washington state law for denying him his requested
accommodation and participation in a government service.225
The federal court found that “[t]here appears to be no published
caselaw that addresses a court’s obligation to provide auxiliary aids to
accommodate a hearing-impaired spectator,” as opposed to participants
in the trial process such as litigants and jurors.226 Reviewing the
language of the DOJ regulations implementing Title II, the court held
(and defendants did not challenge) that “attending a trial as a spectator
is a ‘service, program, or activity’ to which the regulation applies.”227
The court found that Judge Thorpe declined to provide real-time
captioning because he believed that it “could be confusing” and because
of the potential that Rafford “would audibly object during the
proceedings and disrupt the trial.”228 The defendants did not argue that
real-time captioning was unavailable or that it would be too expensive or
burdensome to provide it.229 Because the court found that Judge Thorpe
did not give “primary consideration” to the accommodation that Rafford
requested and did not “investigate whether [the] requested
accommodation [was] reasonable,” the court held that a jury could
potentially find that Judge Thorpe violated the ADA.230
Based on Rafford’s affidavit that even with the assistive listening
device, “he could not hear entire portions of the proceedings,” the court
also held that there was an issue of fact as to whether the assistive
listening device “was a reasonable accommodation and whether plaintiff
222
Rafford v. Snohomish County, No. C07-0947RSL, 2008 WL 346386, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 6, 2008).
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. at *3.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. at *3 n.3.
230
Id. at *3.
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was able to participate equally in the proceedings” compared to other
spectators.231 The court thus permitted Rafford’s claim for declaratory
relief (a declaration that defendants had unlawfully discriminated
against plaintiff by refusing to provide real-time captioning for his son’s
trial) to proceed.232
The court granted judgment for defendants on Rafford’s claim for
injunctive relief to enjoin defendants from denying him real-time
captioning in court proceedings because the trial was over and there was
no evidence that plaintiff planned to attend other proceedings.233 In
addition, the court granted judgment for defendants on Rafford’s claim
for monetary damages, finding that there was no evidence of intentional
discrimination.234 The court found that Judge Thorpe and the county
had provided an assistive listening device, which was the same
accommodation Rafford had requested for his son’s previous trial in
1992, and made various efforts to remedy the problem when Rafford
complained that the assistive listening device was ineffective.235 Rafford
appealed the district court’s dismissal of his claims for monetary
damages premised on intentional discrimination.236 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, agreeing with the district court that “Rafford
failed to present evidence that the County was deliberately indifferent to
his request for a reasonable accommodation.”237
As this decision makes clear, deaf spectators, like other deaf
participants in court proceedings, are entitled to reasonable
accommodations under the ADA and the Rehab Act. Those statutes
make no distinction between spectators and other participants.
However, in federal courts, the Judicial Conference policy does not apply
to deaf spectators.238 In adopting the written guidelines prepared by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Judicial
Conference specifically noted that the policy “does not apply to
spectators.”239 Similarly, the written policy provides that “[t]he services
called for under these guidelines are not required to be provided to

Id. at *4.
Id. at *1, *6.
233
Id. at *2.
234
Id. at *1, *4.
235
Id. at *4.
236
Rafford v. Snohomish County, No. 08-35884, 349 F. App’x 245, 246 (9th Cir. Oct. 27,
2009).
237
Id. (citing Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001); Memmer v.
Marin County Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1999)).
238
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33.
239
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 32, at 14.
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spectators.”240 However, the policy does contain an exception to this
rule. It provides that “courts may elect to [provide accommodations to
spectators] in situations where they determine such to be appropriate,
for example, providing an interpreter to the deaf spouse of a criminal
defendant so that the spouse may follow the course of the trial.”241 Had
Rafford’s son’s civil commitment trial been in a federal court rather than
county court, this exception in the policy likely would have applied to
him.
III. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that there have been significant advances in the
legal rights to accommodations of deaf and hard of hearing participants
in the judicial process. There have also been significant advances in the
technology to provide accommodations. Despite these significant
advances in both the law and technology, it is often lack of knowledge
that is the biggest obstacle today to the ability of deaf and hard of
hearing participants in the judicial system to enjoy meaningful right of
access to the courts. For instance, Mosier, Harrison, Suarez, Popovich,
Kedinger, and others whose stories are described here were plainly
entitled to accommodations under the ADA and Rehab Act.
Lack of knowledge on the part of state officials of the relevant law
may very well have been a reason that the states resisted providing the
required accommodations.242 Lack of knowledge of the technologies is
also an issue. As one deaf lawyer recognized, “the problem those of us
with hearing impairments face is not so much resistance to the idea of
accommodations, but rather ignorance on the facility’s part (and
sometimes that of the hearing impaired person) as to what technology is
available, and how to use it.”243
The continuing growth in the population of deaf lawyers and deaf
judges may be among the single greatest factors that will lead to stronger
enforcement of legal rights of the deaf and hard of hearing. It is no
coincidence, for instance, that a ringing endorsement of Dean Kedinger’s
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE GUIDELINES, supra note 33.
Id.
242
Undue burden may have been a reason in some of these cases as well. For instance,
neither Kentucky nor Florida asserted undue burden as a defense to Mosier’s and
Harrison’s requests for accommodations, but the ongoing burden of providing repeated
accommodations to lawyers likely to be frequent participants in a state judicial system may
have played a role in the degree to which state officials opposed the requests. Because the
undue burden defense under the ADA and Rehab Act is based on the burden to the entire
court system, not to any specific judicial entity, it would have been virtually impossible for
the states to claim undue burden.
243
Sheridan, supra note 51, at 33.
240
241
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right to meaningful access and an effective accommodation was written
by Judge Brown of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. As more judges,
court clerks, and others who routinely make accommodations decisions
become more familiar with the idea of deaf participants in the legal
system—particularly in the context of deaf lawyers and deaf judges, who
are likely to be knowledgeable about their rights and about the available
technologies—that familiarity should lead to greater compliance with the
legal rights of the deaf to meaningful access to the judicial system.
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